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Abstract
Proceeding from the latest versions of the Folk Theorems, the present paper shows that
”natural” evolution of behavior in repeated games in human populations is a very unstable
process which may be easily manipulated by outside forces. Any feasible and individually
rational payoff of the game may be converted in the globally stable outcome by arbitrary
small perturbation of the payoff functions in the repeated game. We show that this result
also holds for a trembling-hand perturbation of the game, and prove a new version of the
Folk theorem for this case. This conclusion is in contrast to Axelrod (1984), Sigmund
and Nowak (1992) and some other researches of evolution of behavior in the repeated
Prisoner’s dilemma. We discuss the reasons of the difference in the results.
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The Folk Theorems in the Framework
of Evolution and Cooperation
Alexander Vasin
1 Introduction
The question if repetition does lead to cooperation has been widely discussed in the game-
theoretic literature since the known paper by Axelrod (1984). Up till now the answer
is ambiguous. Computer simulations started by this work and continued by Sigmund,
Novak (1990,1992) confirm survival and superiority of the behavior strategies which lead
to cooperation. This result was also supported by several theoretic researches (Fudenberg
and Maskin (1990) and Binmore and Samuelson (1992)). However, the Folk theorems
for repeated games (see Van Damme, 1987, for the survey of this field) show that every
individually rational outcome of the stage game can be supported at some Nash equilibrium
of the repeated game. With respect to the evolution of cooperation, this means that
cooperation is not distinguished among many other equilibrium forms of behavior.
The possibility still remained that the cooperative outcome is the only stable one in
some sense, or at least it has some robustic domain of attraction. In this context, the recent
version of the Folk theorem for the dominance solutions ( Vasin, 1994, 1997) is of special
interest. Besides other advantages, the concept of iterated strict dominance elimination
(see Moulin, 1986) is very useful for investigation of the game dynamics. For a wide class of
game dynamical systems it is known that frequencies of all eliminated strategies converge
to 0 as time tends to infinity. This class includes, in particular, the Cournot tatonnement
(Moulin, 1984), replicator dynamics (Vasin, 1989) and selection dynamics (Nachbar,1990).
Our result (Vasin 1997) establishes that the set of strict dominance solution payoffs
of perturbed finitely repeated games converges to the set of individually rational convex
combinations of payoffs in the stage game as the number of repetitions tends to infinity and
the perturbation value tends to 0. With respect to evolution of cooperation, this means the
fail of the conjecture on the special status of cooperative behavior in game dynamics, at
least for repeated games with complete information and unbounded rationality of players.
In a typical case, the construction of the dominance solution corresponding to desirable
behavior in the repeated game is similar to the recursive constructions of the subgame
perfect equilibrium in Benoit and Krishna (1985) and Fudenberg and Maskin (1986). At
every stage each individual has to either realize the corresponding path or punish ”the
last disturber”, i.e., the last player (with the smallest index) who deviated from the rule,
if he has not been already sufficiently punished.
The most important innovation we introduced is a special end-game construction. It
may be interpreted as the perturbation of the repeated game payoffs by some operating
center (called the Manipulator below) who rewards or penalizes players depending on their
behavior during the game. The presence of such center interested in the outcome of the
game is typical for social interactions. For instance, recall about the prosecutor in the
original version of the Prisoner’s dilemma. He is obviously uninterested in ”cooperative”
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behavior of the ”players”. The whole concept of cooperative behavior is doubtful in such
situations involving several persons with different interests and asymmetric positions.
Players’ behavior corresponding to subgame perfect equilibria in Benoit and Krishna
(1985) and Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) (as well as the dominance solution in our paper,
1997) is rather sophisticated. The present paper aims to provide a very simple construction
of the dominance solution for every outcome where payoffs to all players are not less than
their payoffs at some Nash equilibrium of the stage game. After any deviation, players
just switch to playing the Nash equilibrium till the end of the repeated game. The ”last
disturber” looses his/her award. Thus, the idea of the solution is close to Radner (1980)
who considered the Nash equilibria of a similar perturbation of the repeated oligopoly
game. This case covers all individually rational outcomes in the Prisoner’s dilemma and
in the Coordination game with one efficient equilibrium. Then we generalize this result
for a ”trembling- hand” perturbation of a stage game according to Selten, 1975, that is,
for the case where players mistake in their actions with a small probability. In conclusion
we give a brief survey of results which confirm the convergence of evolutionary dynamics
to the cooperative behavior strategies and discuss the reason of the difference with our
results.
2 The formal definitions
Let Γ be a normal form game with the set of players I = {1, . . . , n}, the sets of strategies
X1, . . . , Xn and the payoff functions f1(x), . . . , fn(x), x ∈
⊗
i
Xi. Let (x‖yi) denote the
result of substitution of yi for xi in the strategy combination x = (xi, i ∈ I).
Strategy xi weakly dominates strategy yi on the set X ⊆ X if there exists ǫ ≥ 0 such
that for any z ∈ X
fi(z‖xi) ≥ fi(z‖yi) + ǫ (1)
In contrast to the standard definition, we do not require the strict inequality for at least
one z ∈ X¯ .
Strategy combination x¯ is a weak dominance solution if it may be obtained by means
of the weak dominance elimination procedure (see Moulin, 1981), that is to say, if there
exists a sequence of sets X = X1 ⊃ X2 ⊃ . . .⊃ Xk = {x}, where, for every l = 1, . . . , k−1,
X l =
⊗
i
X li , for any xi ∈ X
l
i \X
l+1
i there exists yi ∈ X
l+1
i that weakly dominates xi on
X l ; xi strictly dominates yi on X if (1) holds for ǫ > 0; x is a strict dominance solution,
if it can be obtained by means of successive elimination of strictly dominated strategies.
Consider a T -fold repetition ΓT of a normal form game Γ. In order to avoid confusion
between strategies in the ΓT and strategies in the initial game, the latter will be referred
to as actions. At any time t every player knows the actions of all participants at previous
periods. Let xt ∈ X be the action combination at time t, ht = (x0, . . . , xt−1) - a history at
this time, X t - the t-fold Cartesian product of X , HT =
T−1⋃
t=0
X t - the set of all histories to
time T (X0
def
= {0}). A strategy of player i is a mapping mi : H
T−1 → Xi. This mapping
determines the choice of the action for every time t and any history ht. Each strategy
combination m = (mi, i ∈ I) induces the path of ΓT h(m) = {x
t(m)}, where x0(m) = 0,
x1(m) = m(0), xt(m) = m(x0(m), . . . , xt−1(m)), t ≥ 1. The payoff function of player i is
given by
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Fi,T (m) = Fi,T (h(m)) =
T−1∑
t=0
fi(x
t(m))/T.
For any game Γ with sets of strategies Yi and payoff functions ui(y), i = 1, . . . , n,
and for any ǫ > 0, let A(Γ, ǫ) denote the set of games with the same sets of players and
strategies and payoff functions u′i(y) which differ from ui(y) less than by ǫ. Since repeated
game ΓT is a particular case of a normal form game, we may consider a set A(ΓT , ǫ) of
its perturbations. Let us stress that any perturbed repeated game Γˆ ∈ A(Γ˜, ǫ) is obtained
from Γ˜ by variation of its payoff functions. The set A(ΓT , ǫ) is wider than the set of
repeated games corresponding to perturbed stage games Γ′ ∈ A(Γ, ǫ).
Our result (1997) describes the limit set of the dominance solution payoffs of games
Γˆ ∈ A(ΓT , ǫ) as T tends to infinity and ǫ tends to 0. Let vi be the minmax payoff of player
i :
vi = min
x
max
xi
fi(x‖xi).
Let W = {f(x), x ∈ X} be the set of payoff vectors for pure strategies, CoW denote
the convex hull of W and Φ = {w ∈ CoW |w ≥ v} be the set of individually rational
convex combinations of payoff vectors in the stage game Γ; M = max
x,z∈X
|f(x)− f(z)|.
Theorem 1. (Vasin, 1997) The set of strict dominance solution payoff vectors of
games Γˆ ∈ A(ΓT , ǫ) converges (in the sense of Hausdorff distance) to the set Φ as T tends
to ∞ and ǫ tends to 0.
The construction of the dominance solution and the payoff perturbation are rather
sophisticated in a general case. The next section studies the problem for a stage game Γ
with a Nash equilibrium x¯.
3 The dominance solution supporting an outcome which
dominates some Nash equilibrium
For any sequence z1, ..., zr of action profiles such that
∑
k f(zk)/k ≥ f(x¯) , we describe
a simple payoff perturbation and a strategy profile m∗ which supports repetition of this
sequence at the dominance solution of the repeated game with the perturbed payoff func-
tions.
In order to explain the construction of the dominance solution corresponding to a
sequence of action profiles, let us consider a version of the coordination game with the set
of actions {1, 2, 3} and the payoff matrix
1 2 3
1 (5, 5, 0) (1, 0, 0) (0, 3, 5)
2 (0, 1, 0) (1, 1, 2) (0, 0, 0)
3 (3, 0, 5) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0)
where the third component shows the gain of the Manipulator who does not act but is
interested in his payoff. More precisely, we assume that he would like to maximize his
average payoff in the T -fold repetition. Thus, action profiles (1, 1) and (2, 2) are resp.
the ”cooperative” and the ”bad” Nash equilibrium for the active players, and alternation
between (1, 3) and (3, 1) is optimal for the Manipulator among sequences of action profiles
which are individually rational for players 1, 2.
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If the Manipulator does not interfere then the natural outcome of the game is repetition
of the cooperative equilibrium. Our purpose is to describe a perturbation of the payoff
function in ΓT which supports alternation between (1, 3) and (3, 1) at the dominance
solution of the perturbed repeated game. The corresponding strategy of each player is to
repeat his/her actions in this sequence till the first deviation and to play action 2 any time
after the deviation if it happens. The payoff function perturbation may be interpreted as
”awards” which the Manipulator pays to the players for ”good behavior” in this game.
The value of the ”award” is 6/T . If nobody deviates from alternating between (1, 3)
and (3, 1) then the both players get their awards. Otherwise the player who is the last
to deviate from the specified strategies is penalized. If the last deviation involved both
players simultaneously then only player 1 does not get the award.
The weak dominance elimination may be realized as follows. At first we can exclude
any strategy such that the first player deviates at time T −1 for some prehistory. If player
1 is the ”last disturber” according to prehistory and player 2 uses action 2 at this time
then this deviation is unprofitable. Otherwise player 1 gains at most 5/T by deviation but
loses 6/T because he/she either becomes the last disturber or misses the chance to pass
this label to player 2. At the next stage every strategy which permits deviation by player
2 at time T − 2 is eliminated in a similar way. Now we can continue this reasoning for the
time T − 2, T − 3, etc. After 2T stages of eliminations, we obtain the desirable solution.
Thus, by spending 12/T for awards, the Manipulator increases his average gain from
0 to 5 in this example.
Now, consider a general case where desirable behavior corresponds to repetition of
z1, ..., zr. Then the strategy profile is as follows. The players repeat this sequence until
at least one of them deviates from this choice. Then they switch to playing x¯ at every
repetition till the end of the game. In order to define the payoff perturbation, consider
the last disturber, that is, the last player (with a minimal index) not to confirm to the
specified behavior rule. This player is penalized with the fine rM . More formally,
m∗i (h
t) = z({t/m}+ 1)ifxs = z({s/m}+ 1)for anys < t, otherwisem∗i (h
t) = x¯i. (2)
For any path hT , let
s(ht) = max{s < t s.t. xs 6= m∗(hs)}
denote the last time of deviation before t, and
i(ht) = min{i s.t. x
s(ht)
i 6= m
∗
i (h
s(ht))}
denote the last disturber to time t. The fine for deviation is
ϕi(h
T ) = rM/T for i = i(hT )
and is 0 for any other i. Finally, the perturbed payoff function is
Fˆi(m) = Fi,T (m)− ϕi(h(m)), i= 1, . . . , n. (3)
Proposition 1. Strategy profilem∗ defined according to (2) is a weak dominance solution
of game Γˆ with payoff functions (3).
Proof actually repeats arguing for the example above. Consider the player 1 and any
strategym1 such thatm1(h
T−1) 6= m∗1(h
T−1) for some hT−1. Let us show that strategy m¯1,
s.t. m¯1(h
t) = m1(h
t) for any t < T − 1 and m¯1(h
T−1) = m∗1(h
T−1) for any hT−1, weakly
dominates m1. Consider any strategy profile m including m1. If h
T−1(m) = hT−1(m∗)
then deviating fromm∗1(h
T−1(m)) is unprofitable since it makes player 1 the last disturber,
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and he has to pay the fine rM/T while by deviating he gains at most M/T . Otherwise
consider the last disturber to the time T − 1. If i(m, T − 1) 6= 1 or xj(h
T−1(m)) 6= x¯j for
some j 6= 1 then by deviating player 1 is missing the chance to pass the label of the last
disturber to another player, and we can argue as in the previous case. Otherwise deviating
brings nothing since x¯ is a Nash equilibrium. We can continue this reasoning by induction
for i = 2, 3, . . . , n and then for t = T − 2, . . . , 0. The only correction is that by deviating
at time T − k a player can gain at most min{k, r}M .
4 The theorem for a trembling-hand perturbation of the
model
Random mistakes introduce some difficulties in the proposed scheme of behavior regula-
tion. Consider a game GT,d which is a trembling-hand perturbation of the repeated game
ΓT according to Selten,1975. In this game, for any prehistory h
t and strategy mi, the
action of player i in period t is mi(h
t) with probability 1 − d and any other action with
probability d/(| X i | −1). Every strategy profile m determines a probability distribution
Pd(h
T | m) over the set of paths hT . Let each player be interested in his/her expected
payoff
gi(m) =
∑
hT
Pd(h
T | m)Fi(h
T )
.
Assume that the desirable behavior of the players corresponds to action profile x∗
such that f(x∗) ≥ f(x¯) for some Nash equilibrium x¯. Consider the strategy profile m∗
corresponding to x∗ according to the section 3. Let us define the perturbed payoff functions
as follows. For every path hT , we can compute the last disturber to the time T as above.
Let him pay the fine ϕ¯ while other players pay nothing. Formally, the value of the fine is
given by the following function:
ϕi(h
T ) = ϕ¯ if i = i(hT ) otherwise ϕi(h
T ) = 0. (4)
Consider a game GˆT with payoff functions
gˆi(m) =
∑
hT
p(hT | m)(Fi(h
T )− ϕi(h
T ))
Proposition 2. Let the value of the fine ϕ¯ > M/(TaT ), where a =def (1− d)n. Then m∗
is a strict dominance solution of the game GˆT if 1− d > d/ | Xi |, i = 1, . . . , n.
Proof. Assume that for every i = 1, . . . , n we have already eliminated all strategies
mi such that mi(h
τ) 6= m∗i (h
τ) for some τ > t, hτ . Consider any ht and m1 such that
m1(h
t) = z1 6= m
∗
1(h
t) . Let us show that m¯1, such that m¯1(h
t) = m∗1(h
t), m¯1(h´
τ) =
m1(h´
τ) for any other τ, h´, strictly dominates m1. First consider the case where 1 is the
last disturber after ht.Then, according to m∗, the players have to play x¯ since t till the
end of the game. Let gˆi(h
t, m) denote the expected gain of player i in Gˆ under history ht
and profile m. Then, for any d > 0,
gˆ1(h
t, m || m¯1)− gˆ1(h
t, m) > min
x
((1− d)2 − (d/ | Xi |)
2)(gˆ1(h
t, x || x¯1, m
∗)−
gˆ(ht1, x || z1, m
∗).
Consider the last difference. If x = x¯ then 1 gains nothing by deviating since x¯ is a
Nash equilibrium, and behavior since time t + 1 does not depend on xt1. Otherwise, by
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deviating from x¯1, player 1 gains at most M but increases the probability to become the
last disturber at the time T and to pay the fine ϕ¯ in a(T−t−1). Thus, m¯1 ≻ m1.
The same reasoning works if some other player is the last disturber at time t. If
nobody is then the only difference is that the expected total gain in repetitions since t+1
decreases by deviation since the players will have to switch from x∗ to x¯. We can continue
this arguing for players 2, . . . , n and thus complete the proof.
Proposition 3. The mean time of playing x∗ in the game Gˆ under the strategy profile
m∗ is
τ(T ) = (1− aT )/(1− a)− TaT−1(1− a) (5)
Proof. The probability of playing x∗ t times , t < T , is at(1−a), and for T this probability
is aT . Thus, the mean time is (1− a)
∑T−1
1 τa
τ + TaT which coincides with (5).
Proceeding from the propositions 2, 3, the profile m∗ does not ensure the desirable
behavior for T > 1/d. Let T = k/d for some k > 1. Then, for d small enough, a ≈ 1−nd,
aT ≈ exp(−nk), the mean share of the time of playing x∗ is τ(T )/T ≈ (1 − e−nk)/nk −
n(1−nd)e−nk and tends to 0 as k tends to infinity, while the necessary amount of the fine
is about dMexp(kn)/k and tends to infinity.
One possibility to improve the strategy is partitioning of the time of the game into s
intervals of the same length T¯ = k/d and playing the profile m∗ independently in each
interval. Letm∗∗ denote this strategy combination. The corresponding payoff perturbation
assumes that, after each interval, the players pay the fine (4) according to their behavior
within this interval. Let ϕ∗∗(hT ) denote the corresponding perturbation of the total payoff.
Then the maximal value of the perturbation is about dMexp(kn)/k for any small d and
k ∼ O(1/d1/s), s ∈ Z. Under m∗∗, the mean time of playing x∗ related to T is the same as
in (5). Thus, for any game Γ with a Nash equilibrium x¯ , we obtain the following result.
Theorem 2. For any ε > 0, there exist d´ > 0 and T´ such that for any d < d´ and
T > T´ , every action profile x∗ such that fi(x
∗) ≥ fi(x¯) , i = 1, . . . , n, may be supported
at the strict dominance solutionm of game Gˆ ∈ A(GT , ε) such that the mean share of the
time of playing x∗ under m exceeds 1− ε.
Proof. Consider the game GˆT with the payoff perturbation φ
∗∗. For d small enough,
the strategy profilem∗∗ is a strict dominance solution if the fine exceeds dMexp(kn)/k.The
mean share of the time of playing x∗ is given by (4). In order to make this share more
than 1− ε, let us set k such that 1 − e−nk > nk(1 − ε). Since e−nk < 1 − nk + nk2/2 it
suffices to set k = 2ε/n. Now, in order to make the total payoff perturbation less then ε,
choose d such that ndMe2ε/2ε < ε. It suffices to take d¯ = ε2/nM . Finally, T should be
large enough to divide it into equal intervals of length k/d = 4M/ε.
Corollary. For any game Γ with Nash equilibrium x¯ such that vi = fi(x¯), i = 1, . . . , n,
consider a trembling-hand perturbation GT of T -fold repetition of Γ. The set of the strict
dominance solution payoffs in games GˆT ∈ A(GT , ε) converges to the set Φ of individually
rational convex combination of payoffs in Γ as T tends to infinity and ε tends to 0.
Proof. The only difference with the proof of the theorem is that, instead of playing x∗ in
every repetition, the desirable behavior in this case is a repeated sequence of action profiles
z1, . . . , zr such that
∑
k f(zk)/r approximates a given w ∈ Φ. The minor modifications
include r-fold increasing of the fine. Thus, we have proved the Folk theorem for the
dominance solutions of games in the specified class.
5 Discussion
One important direction in studying of evolution of cooperation is computer simulation
of behavior dynamics in the iterated Prisoner’s dilemma. Two players engaged in the
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Prisoner’s dilemma have to choose between cooperation (C) and defection (D). In any
given round, each player receives R if both cooperate and payoff P < R if both defect;
but a defector exploiting a cooperator gets T points, while the cooperator receives S (with
T > R > P > S and 2R > T + S). Thus in a single round it is always best to defect,
but cooperation may be rewarded in an iterated Prisoner’s dilemma. Axelrod’s Computer
tournaments (see Axelrod, 1984) have shown that the known ”tit for tat” strategy which
supports cooperation wins the competition with other deterministic strategies where the
decision to cooperate or defect in each round depends on the outcome of the three previous
rounds. Nowak and Sigmund(1990) have considered the case where the decision depends
only on the previous round, but is stochastic and not deterministic. Each strategy con-
sisted of two parameters, pC and pD. These give the probability of cooperating after a C
(cooperate) orD (defect) by the other player. In these simulations Generous-TFT (pC = 1
and pD = 1/3 given the usual payoffs) appeared to be a stable end state, as almost any
starting condition converged to it provided the run was long enough.
Later Nowak and Sigmund (1992) extended this treatment to ”memory 2” strategies,
in which players base their decision on the other player’s action as well as on their own
previous action . They found a different strategy dominating the long-term behavior.
They called this strategy ”Pavlov” or ”win-stay, lose-shift”(WSLS) because if it receives
a good payoff (either T or R) it repeats its previous action (D in the former and C in the
latter). Conversely if it receives a low payoff (P or S) it prefers to change its behavior
next time.
A general conclusion from these models is that strategies which support cooperation
dominate in the long-run prospect.
This proposition is supported by several theoretical results. Fudenberg and Maskin
(1990) and Binmore and Samuelson (1992) consider different variants of supergames with
time-average payoffs, bounded rationality and symmetry of players and establish that the
stable behavior is connected with the ”utilitarian” payoff vectors which maximize the
sum of player’s payoffs. The notion of a utilitarian outcome generalizes the concept of
cooperative behavior for symmetric two-player games. Thus, all mentioned papers make
impression that evolution of behavior in repeated games leads to cooperation.
The main reason of such contrast to our conclusions is the bounded rationality of
players in the mentioned models. The strategy combinations specified in the sections 3,
4 become the dominance solutions only if behavior of the players is flexible with respect
to the time till ”the day of reckoning” T . If we consider players with bounded rationality,
according to Kalai and Stanford (1988), thenm∗ is not a dominance solution for sufficiently
large T . But the specified flexibility seems to be typical for human behavior.
The reasonable question about the proposed scheme of behavior manipulation is if the
active players can withstand it in the case where the imposed behavior is unprofitable
for them, as in the example above. Of course, if some of them are sufficiently intelligent
and have enough free money then they can create a ”counter-manipulator” supporting
cooperative behavior. One thing we would like to stress is that the cooperation (as well
as other nice things) needs some regulation to support it.
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